- Well said, Jim. The IGDA guidelines may indeed be unrealistic, though they point us in the right direction. Phenomenology--the contents and structure of the patient's inner world--is also a way of putting the "person"back into diagnosis. As Maimonides reminded us 8 centuries ago, "The physician does not cure a disease, but a diseased person." --Best, Ron
The Missing Person in the DSM
The Missing Person in the DSM
Here’s a question. As you sit across from your patient, what or whom are you treating: Ms Smith’s bipolar illness, or Ms Smith, a person with bipolar illness? The DSM leans toward the first choice. The manual classifies diagnoses and disorders, not people. This is fitting with the medical model, according to which a medical nosology includes hypertension and diabetes, not the individuals who suffer from them.
Is there then any difference between a medical diagnosis and a psychiatric diagnosis? Granting the many exceptions to this generalization, could we say that a psychiatric diagnosis is more wrapped into the personality of the patient than a medical diagnosis—Ms Smith’s bipolar condition more imbricated into her personality than Mr Jones’ hypertension into his. Mr Jones, after all, can distance himself from his condition, not think about it, and not even know he has it. That will all be harder for Ms Smith. Denial of a symptomatic mental disorder is not quite the same as total ignorance of a silent hypertension.
Identifying a patient by his or her DSM diagnosis is often like choosing a cheap suit off the bargain-basement rack. The fit is awkward and uncomfortable, and we would like to offer our patients a more tailored look.
So we would choose the second of the above choices: we are treating Ms Smith, a person with bipolar illness. We recognize both the individual person and the diagnostic category, and we recognize that one person’s bipolar illness looks quite different from another’s. The one-size-fits-all style of medical nosology doesn’t work very well with our psychiatric patients.
DSM-IV makes some effort to capture the particularity of the individual patient with 2 strategies. The first is the multi-axial system, the third and fourth axes adding more information about the patient. The second strategy is co-morbidity. Adding a second and even third diagnosis distinguishes patients who share a primary diagnosis. These strategies are of course not very effective; and indeed, co-morbidity is considered something of a curse of DSM-IV.
The authors of DSM-5 are taking another approach to making our diagnostic suits fit a little better. They are trying to loosen the rigidity of the categorical diagnoses with the use of dimensions—dimensions for individual diagnoses and the cross-cutting dimensions. Diagnostic categories are the cheap suits off the rack; dimensional diagnoses are the finely tailored suits. Or so they are claimed to be. It remains to be seen how well they will fit our patients, if by that we mean, how well they will capture the particularity of the patient—or, to address the title of this piece, whether they will bring the missing person back into the DSM.
These efforts of DMS-IV and DSM-5 are nothing compared to a project of the World Psychiatric Association to develop a series of International Guidelines for Diagnostic Assessment (IGDA).1 One of the guidelines, IGDA 8, titled “Idiographic (Personalised) Diagnostic Formulation”2 recommends an idiographic component to the diagnostic formulation.“3 The diagnosis itself should combine a nomothetic or standarized diagnostic formulation (ICD-10, DSM-IV) with an idiographic (personalized) diagnostic formulation reflecting the uniqueness of the patient’s personal experience. At the nomothetic level, a multi-axial diagnostic formulation is recommended. For the idiographic formulation, an integration of the perspectives of the clinician, patient, and family should be presented in natural language.”4[p.41] The “idiographic” guideline provides 10 pointers for developing the formulation, along with a model page format.
The IGDA guidelines, with the idiographic component, go a long way toward addressing the problem described in this article. They are, however, an ambitious, not to say quixotic, project, given that the evaluation of a patient following the IGDA guidelines would require hours. In the real world of hurly-burly clinical practice, it is difficult to imagine busy clinicians being able to follow these guidelines.
So where does this leave us with the missing person in the DSM? I will propose an answer in my next blog.
References
1. Mezzich JE, Berganza M, von Cranach M, et al (eds). Essentials of the World Psychiatric Association’s International Guidelines for Diagnostic Assessment (IGDA). Br J Psychiatry Suppl. 2003;45:S35-S66.
2. IGDA Workgroup, WPA. IGDA. 8: Idiographic (personalised) diagnostic formulation. In: Mezzich JE, Berganza M, von Cranach M, et al (eds). Essentials of the World Psychiatric Association’s International Guidelines for Diagnostic Assessment (IGDA). Br J Psychiatry Suppl. 2003;45;S55-S57.
3. Phillips J. Idiographic formulations, symbols, narratives, context and meaning. Psychopathology. 2005;38:180-184.
4. IGDA Workgroup, WPA. IGDA. 1: Conceptual bases—historical, cultural and clinical perspectives. In: Mezzich JE, Berganza M, von Cranach M, et al (eds). Essentials of the World Psychiatric Association’s International Guidelines for Diagnostic Assessment (IGDA). Br J Psychiatry Suppl. 2003;45;S40-S41.
well said jim... we psychiatrists should never forget that our ultimate aim is to treat a human being, not a disorder....
Ron, I love the Maimonides quote. I will remember it. Thanks, Jim
Hello, Dr. Phillips. When should we expect your next blog posting? I look forward to reading it! Abbie Kendall* *A woman (being treated by a great psychiatrist) with severe GAD, Treatment-resistant Major Depressive Disorder, seemingly permanent insomnia, occasional suicidality, regular dashes of mania, and a sparkling, optimistic personality. (What style of "suit" do you recommend for me? ;-)
HI! Thought you guys might be interested in this humorous video about DSM V that I ran across. It's called, "Is Being Human a Mental Disorder?" http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UYBkrlnTgi8
Creo que el DSM en sus comienzos cumplia una función estadística y fué trasformandose en lo que es ahora, "Un manual de Diagnósticos". El diagnóstico es un arte y su base es la clínica. Dado que en la practica cotidiana un individuo que consulta es único y es único su entorno familar, psicosocial, etc. Que necesidad habría de que existieran psiquiatras si con solo usar el manual llegamos a un diagnóstico. Que nos sea útil para mas o menos tener un mismo lenguaje entre colegas es una cosa pero llegar ha este reduccionismo es imposible en la actualidad. Si bién soy Argentino, el DSM se aplica en todo el mundo, este es el motivo de mi incurción. Y para finalizar la practica de la psiquiatría cambia, la clinica psiquiatrica no.
When considering reforming our diagnostic system, I suggest that the mental status exam be given more "weight"when establishing a diagnosis. After all, SYMPTOMS - as reported to a clinician - can only be communicated as verbal constructs - what the patient recalls, interprets, has the capacity to put into words , or what he or she is culturally predisposed to emphasize, neglect, etc. This applies even more to questionnaires and symptom-checklists. (Thus trends to rely on questionnaires go precisely in the wrong direction). One must of course consider symptoms, but relying on such "left hemisphere" verbal reconstructions is not enough. The DSM should have more criteria based on what one OBSERVES "in the room" (this could include the emotional response of a TRAINED observer). For example, I often find that ascertaining PAST manic episodes is very unreliable (unless they were extremely florid), but I have NO QUESTION of when a patient is manic "in the room". Emphasizing OBSERVABLE SIGNS in our manual would comport to good clinical practice, and would be analogous, in general medicine, to diagnosing conditions not only by symptoms, but by the SIGNS of the physical exam.
