Paranoid Schizophrenia

 

Condemning Torture and Abuse: A Call to Action

February 29, 2012

The plain fact is that nothing that has been claimed in the name of defending our country can justify cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of another man or woman. Torture, in any form-light or heavy-is not a tool of interrogation or useful for gathering good intelligence.

Inflammation, Psychosis, and the Brain

July 11, 2009

When the solution to a clinical or scientific puzzle eludes us for more than a century, as with schizophrenia, we need new methods to examine the pathology. If we want to make an impact on the disease we must shift research paradigms and focus on the early detection, early intervention, and new avenues of treatment that address different symptoms of schizophrenia.

Patient Advocacy-and a Deadly Outcome

October 01, 2008

William Bruce, a young man with symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia, was released from Maine’s state-run Riverview Psychiatric Center in April, 2006. Two months later, he killed his mother with a hatchet. Bruce subsequently was found not criminally responsible by reason of insanity and was recommitted to Riverview.

Psychiatric Testimony and the Insanity Defense

April 02, 2008

The Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Clark v Arizona1 was one of the most unexpected defeats the American Psychiatric Association (APA) has had since it began regularly submitting amicus briefs to the Court 35 years ago.

Psychiatric Naturalism and the Dimensions of Freedom: Implications for Psychiatry and the Law

October 01, 2007

In part 1 of this essay, I argued that individual freedom is not only compatible with determinism but dependent on it. I also argued that freedom is not an "either/or" condition. Rather, actions may be more or less free, and therefore, more or less "responsible," depending on a number of contingent factors, yielding various degrees of freedom. Psychiatrists, I suggested, can be most helpful in so far as we can describe, study, and categorize these degrees of freedom and the psychopathological conditions that undermine them. In part 2, I elaborate on the "naturalistic" model of freedom and autonomy and suggest how it may be applied to psychiatric disorders and medico-legal determinations of culpability.