Ronald W. Pies, MD

Ronald W. Pies, MD

Dr Pies is Professor Emeritus of Psychiatry and Lecturer on Bioethics and Humanities, SUNY Upstate Medical University; Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, Tufts University School of Medicine; and Editor in Chief Emeritus of Psychiatric Times (2007-2010). Dr Pies is the author of several books, including several textbooks on psychopharmacology. A collection of his works can be found on Amazon.

Articles by Ronald W. Pies, MD

In 2 previous editorials-“The ‘McDonaldization’ of Psychiatry” and “Doctor, Are You ‘Drugging’ or Medicating Your Patients?”-I focused on some serious problems in current psychiatric practice and on various shortcomings in our treatments. In the third “panel” of this editorial triptych, I want to take note of the considerable good that psychiatric treatment may bring to those who suffer with devastating illnesses.

There are 2 rooms a physician should never enter, or even go near: the executioner’s chamber and the interrogator’s cell. I’m speaking figuratively, but I have very concrete circumstances in mind. Indeed, in recent years, psychiatrists have been drawn into controversies related to both these “rooms”-one involving the physician’s role in capital punishment cases; the other, in cases related to the interrogation of suspected terrorists.

In a very long essay in the Sunday (1/10/10) New York Times Magazine entitled, “The Americanization of Mental Illness,” Ethan Watters suggests that a kind of psychiatric-cultural imperialism has been foisted on other countries and cultures by “the West.”

The most rigorous scientific review of “medical marijuana” to date was carried out by the Institute of Medicine in 1999, under the direction of Drs John A. Benson Jr and Stanley J. Watson Jr.1 The institute’s conclusions were considerably more nuanced and qualified than those of the US Drug Enforcement Administration.2 The institute report found that:

As a general proposition, most scientists and physicians prefer sharpness to fuzziness, at least when it comes to defining terms. I generally share this view, as regards psychiatric diagnosis, but only up to a point. That point is defined by the well-being of my patient - and sometimes, this may call for a “fuzzy” diagnosis.

The press reported it in various ways-either as a “brutal gang rape” or, more forensically, as a “21/2-hour assault” on the Richmond High School campus. Any way you look at it, the horrendous attack on a 15-year-old girl raises troubling questions for theologians, criminologists and, of course, psychiatrists. How do we understand an act as brutal as rape? What factors and forces in the rapist’s development can possibly account for such behavior? And how on earth do we explain the apparent indifference of the large crowd that watched the attack in Richmond, Calif, and allegedly did nothing to stop it-or even, to report it?

The debate within the medical profession over “conflicts of interest” (COIs) has often been shrill, and sometimes seems to be based on misunderstandings or myths about what COIs entail. In this psychiatrist’s view, it is helpful to step back from confident proclamations, acknowledge that the issues involved are complex, and aspire to some semblance of humility. Nobody has cornered the market on “the right way” to deal with COI in the realms of medical research, publication, and education.1 At the same time, as Alan Stone, MD, has noted (personal communication, August 27, 2009), ethical considerations lie at the heart of any debate on COI-in particular, the ancient dictum, “Do no harm.” Indeed, ethicist James M. DuBois has pointed out a direct connection between some types of COI and harm to the general public: “Mental health consumers are at risk when studies that involve questionable scientific and publication practices are translated into therapeutic practice.”1(p205)

The press reported it in various ways-either as a “brutal gang rape” or, more forensically, as a “2½-hour assault” on the Richmond High School campus. Anyway you look at it, the horrendous attack on a 15-year old girl raises troubling questions for theologians, criminologists, and, of course, psychiatrists.

You have read the blogs and seen the placards a dozen times: doctors prescribe too many “drugs” for too many patients. Psychiatrists, in particular, are popular targets of politically motivated language that seeks to conflate the words “medication” and “drug”-thereby tapping into the public’s understandable fears concerning “drug abuse” and its need to carry out a “War on Drugs.”

The editorial board and staff of Psychiatric Times wish to announce, with much regret, the retirement of Max Fink, MD, from our journal’s editorial board. Dr Fink-who is emeritus professor of psychiatry and neurology at the State University of New York at Stony Brook-has been a valued member of our board since 2002, and a regular contributor to the journal for many years before that.

>I greatly enjoyed Dr Ron Pies’ editorial “What Should Count as a Mental Disorder in DSM-V?”1 in which he encouraged framers of DSM-V to critically examine the boundaries of mental illness and to more carefully distinguish between diseases, disorders, and syndromes. As I have noted elsewhere, current plans to integrate a “spectrum” approach into DSM-V require a careful consideration of these issues that must be defensible to critics of diagnostic expansion within psychiatry.2

After a stellar academic career of 44 years, Dr Domeena Renshaw has announced her retirement from Loyola University, where she has been professor of psychiatry and behavioral neurosciences. We are sad to say that Dr Renshaw will also be retiring from the editorial board of Psychiatric Times, on which she has served diligently for many years.

In a highly charged environment in which reports of potential conflicts of interest between physicians and pharmaceutical companies dominate the headlines almost daily, we want to point out that the supplements that were mailed with this month’s issue of Psychiatric Times were based on meetings funded by drug companies. The supplement on treatment-resistant depression, which was sponsored by Lilly USA,includes an article that focuses on the company’s drug Symbyax.

Regular readers of Psychiatric Times know that we have been engaged in a comprehensive review of our “conflict of interest” (COI) and disclosure policies, which now include posted disclosure statements from all our editorial board members. So far as we are aware, Psychiatric Times is the only major psychiatric journal to require this of its editorial board, as well as of our regular writers.

A 52-year-old female college professor was referred to a psychiatrist by a nurse practitioner at the college health clinic. The referring diagnosis was “adjustment disorder with depressed mood versus atypical depression with somatization; rule out fibromyalgia.”

In our own time, many so-called conflicts of interest (COI) boil down to temptation, as James DuBois,3 professor and department chair of health care ethics at Saint Louis University, notes in his excellent chapter on this subject. A physician-researcher is tempted to slant the results of his or her study in order to maintain funding from a medical technology company.

The adage has it that the road to hell is paved with good intentions. It is evident from this revealing portrait of neurologist Walter Freeman--the originator of the infamous "ice pick" lobotomy--that good intentions without sober analysis can indeed have hellish consequences.

Here is the conundrum: You have completed treatment with a fascinating and complex patient. Mr A has bipolar depression, Marfan syndrome, and hypothyroidism. You not only managed to navigate around the rocks of his medical problems, but you also managed to stabilize Mr A's bipolar disorder using a combination of lithium (Eskalith, Lithobid), thyroxine, and interpersonal therapy. You would now like to share your experience with colleagues, so you write up the case history; then suddenly, you are seized with misgivings.

In part 1 of this essay, I argued that individual freedom is not only compatible with determinism but dependent on it. I also argued that freedom is not an "either/or" condition. Rather, actions may be more or less free, and therefore, more or less "responsible," depending on a number of contingent factors, yielding various degrees of freedom. Psychiatrists, I suggested, can be most helpful in so far as we can describe, study, and categorize these degrees of freedom and the psychopathological conditions that undermine them. In part 2, I elaborate on the "naturalistic" model of freedom and autonomy and suggest how it may be applied to psychiatric disorders and medico-legal determinations of culpability.